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sponsors, some protesters brought posters to the U.S. Embassy and State
Department officials saying they were owed money.
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. Disassociating oneself from the accused in the conspiracy. Soon after the December
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011 post-election demonstration on Bolotnaya Square, the Communist Party
leader Gennady Zyuganov called it an “orange leprosy,” while Igor Lebedev,
head of the Liberal Democratic faction in the State Duma, added that the protests
had been arranged by U.S. intelligence.
However, none of these methods helped opposition members neutralize the
conspiracy theories directed against them. The overwhelming information superiority of
government supporters allowed them to conduct massive brainwashing techniques,
while the voices of their opponents were poorly heard. The spread of the fear of Russian
destabilization, inspired by the latter’s foreign enemies, likely is an important factor in
Putin’s victory in the presidential elections of 2012.
Conclusion
Conspiracy theories in the 2000s fell on the fertile ground of the Soviet “besieged
fortress” mentality, a widespread perception that the troubles of the 1990s resulted from
external enemies’ intrigues, and the pervasiveness of conspiracy thinking in the circles
of security and defense officers that gained great influence during Putin’s era.
But Putin and his high-ranking subordinates began to actively use conspiracy
theories about external enemies only in the middle of 2000s, after the series of color
revolutions in post-Soviet states. At first, such allegations were directed against
politically active NGOs. They were aimed at shutting off uncontrolled sources of
funding and organizational support for liberal opposition activists. It is remarkable that
accusations directed toward opponents of the regime were habitually devoid of
specifics—no “external enemies“ or their “domestic accomplices“ were actually named,
though the United States and its close allies were typically implied.
In the election campaigns of 2011-2012, Putin and his team resorted to conspiracy
theories on an unprecedented scale, not only to disempower their opponents but also to
rally their supporters. Largely because of the regime’s overwhelming information
superiority, this tactic proved successful, becoming one of the most important factors in
the regime’s electoral success.
©
PONARS Eurasia 2012. The George Washington University Elliott School of International Affairs. This publication was
made possible by a grant from Carnegie Corporation of New York. The statements made and views expressed are solely
the responsibility of the author. www.ponarseurasia.org
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