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The “Orange Plague” and “Scavenging” Civic Activists
During the first few years of Putin’s presidency, the administration did not
systematically resort to conspiracy rhetoric. While international terrorism was labeled
Russia’s main external enemy, the United States and NATO were positioned as allies in
the common fight against evil, especially after the events of September 11, 2001.
However, the situation changed after the series of color revolutions in the post-
Soviet space starting in 2003-2004. Many in the ruling elite perceived and portrayed
these events as steps in a purposeful plan to establish pro-Western regimes in post-
Soviet states, driving Russia out of its traditional sphere of influence. Moreover, the
Ukrainian events—which Russian opponents labelled as the ”orange plague”—were
interpreted by some as a test plot intended to be used later in Russia to replace the
existing government with a pro-American puppet regime. The prevention of “color
revolutions” became one of the main priorities for pro-government youth organizations
such as “Nashi” and the “Young Guard of United Russia,” both of which emerged in
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005.
Unsurprisingly, politically active non-profit organizations and their Russian-
based foreign donors were targeted by the authorities. Already in 2004, the Soros
Foundation terminated its projects in Russia. In early 2006, amid an espionage scandal
involving an officer from the British embassy in Moscow responsible for financial
assistance to some NGOs, a new law placed Russian non-profit organizations under
strict bureaucratic control with wide scope for arbitrary government enforcement,
seriously limiting the participation of foreigners in such organizations.
The campaign against NGOs damaged many Russian recipients of foreign
grants, including academics for whom this kind of financial support was a significant
supplement to a meager salary. While no attack on academic grantholders could be
linked to the government, such people often fell under suspicion of the vigilant regional
branches of the security services and of cautious university functionaries, some of whom
considered any cooperation with Western (especially U.S.) funders and partners as a
betrayal of Russian national interests.1
During the election campaign of 2007-08, Putin and his supporters strongly
focused on incriminating liberal opponents for plotting against Russia in concert with
foreign enemies. In a speech to supporters in November 2007, Putin declared that this
opposition had learned from Western experts how to organize color revolutions, that
they had practiced these skills in neighboring countries and were seeking to do the same
in Russia. Putin alleged that the opposition was “scavenging” at foreign diplomatic
missions in the hopes of obtaining funding and support. It is notable that in this and
other cases, Putin usually only vaguely mentioned would-be external and internal
conspirators. According to Matthew Gray, author of Conspiracy Theories in the Arab World
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Some academics even used public accusations of supplying foreign intelligence services with
sensitive information to settle scores with rival colleagues.
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