participation exists, there can be no such thing as falsehood. And, with

the view of meeting this evasion, we must begin by enquiring into the

nature of language, opinion, and imagination, in order that when we

find them we may find also that they have communion with not-being, and,

having made out the connexion of them, may thus prove that falsehood

exists; and therein we will imprison the Sophist, if he deserves it, or,

if not, we will let him go again and look for him in another class.

THEAETETUS: Certainly, Stranger, there appears to be truth in what

was said about the Sophist at first, that he was of a class not easily

caught, for he seems to have abundance of defences, which he throws up,

and which must every one of them be stormed before we can reach the man

himself. And even now, we have with difficulty got through his first

defence, which is the not-being of not-being, and lo! here is another;

for we have still to show that falsehood exists in the sphere of

language and opinion, and there will be another and another line of

defence without end.

STRANGER: Any one, Theaetetus, who is able to advance even a little

ought to be of good cheer, for what would he who is dispirited at a

little progress do, if he were making none at all, or even undergoing

a repulse? Such a faint heart, as the proverb says, will never take a

city: but now that we have succeeded thus far, the citadel is ours, and

what remains is easier.

THEAETETUS: Very true.

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