STRANGER: Then, as I was saying, let us first of all obtain a conception

of language and opinion, in order that we may have clearer grounds for

determining, whether not-being has any concern with them, or whether

they are both always true, and neither of them ever false.

THEAETETUS: True.

STRANGER: Then, now, let us speak of names, as before we were speaking

of ideas and letters; for that is the direction in which the answer may

be expected.

THEAETETUS: And what is the question at issue about names?

STRANGER: The question at issue is whether all names may be connected

with one another, or none, or only some of them.

THEAETETUS: Clearly the last is true.

STRANGER: I understand you to say that words which have a meaning when

in sequence may be connected, but that words which have no meaning when

in sequence cannot be connected?

THEAETETUS: What are you saying?

STRANGER: What I thought that you intended when you gave your assent;

119

Sophist