the nature of discourse presses upon us at this moment; if utterly

deprived of it, we could no more hold discourse; and deprived of it we

should be if we admitted that there was no admixture of natures at all.

THEAETETUS: Very true. But I do not understand why at this moment we

must determine the nature of discourse.

STRANGER: Perhaps you will see more clearly by the help of the following

explanation.

THEAETETUS: What explanation?

STRANGER: Not-being has been acknowledged by us to be one among many

classes diffused over all being.

THEAETETUS: True.

STRANGER: And thence arises the question, whether not-being mingles with

opinion and language.

THEAETETUS: How so?

STRANGER: If not-being has no part in the proposition, then all things

must be true; but if not-being has a part, then false opinion and false

speech are possible, for to think or to say what is not--is falsehood,

which thus arises in the region of thought and in speech.

116

Sophist