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In the sense I intend, it is, in fact, a mobile without motive, a motive
not motivirt. Through its promptings we act without comprehensible
object; or, if this shall be understood as a contradiction in terms, we
may so far modify the proposition as to say, that through its promptings
we act, for the reason that we should not. In theory, no reason can be
more unreasonable, but, in fact, there is none more strong. With certain
minds, under certain conditions, it becomes absolutely irresistible. I
am not more certain that I breathe, than that the assurance of the wrong
or error of any action is often the one unconquerable force which impels
us, and alone impels us to its prosecution. Nor will this overwhelming
tendency to do wrong for the wrong's sake, admit of analysis, or
resolution into ulterior elements. It is a radical, a primitive
impulse-elementary. It will be said, I am aware, that when we persist in
acts because we feel we should not persist in them, our conduct is but a
modification of that which ordinarily springs from the combativeness
of phrenology. But a glance will show the fallacy of this idea. The
phrenological combativeness has for its essence, the necessity of
self-defence. It is our safeguard against injury. Its principle regards
our well-being; and thus the desire to be well is excited simultaneously
with its development. It follows, that the desire to be well must
be excited simultaneously with any principle which shall be merely a
modification of combativeness, but in the case of that something which I
term perverseness, the desire to be well is not only not aroused, but a
strongly antagonistical sentiment exists.
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