'Not-being never is, and do thou keep thy thoughts from this way of

enquiry.'

THEAETETUS: Yes, he says so.

STRANGER: Whereas, we have not only proved that things which are not

are, but we have shown what form of being not-being is; for we have

shown that the nature of the other is, and is distributed over all

things in their relations to one another, and whatever part of the other

is contrasted with being, this is precisely what we have ventured to

call not-being.

THEAETETUS: And surely, Stranger, we were quite right.

STRANGER: Let not any one say, then, that while affirming the opposition

of not-being to being, we still assert the being of not-being; for as to

whether there is an opposite of being, to that enquiry we have long

said good-bye--it may or may not be, and may or may not be capable of

definition. But as touching our present account of not-being, let a man

either convince us of error, or, so long as he cannot, he too must say,

as we are saying, that there is a communion of classes, and that

being, and difference or other, traverse all things and mutually

interpenetrate, so that the other partakes of being, and by reason of

this participation is, and yet is not that of which it partakes, but

other, and being other than being, it is clearly a necessity that

not-being should be. And again, being, through partaking of the other,

113

Sophist