STRANGER: And the not-great may be said to exist, equally with the

great?

THEAETETUS: Yes.

STRANGER: And, in the same way, the just must be placed in the same

category with the not-just--the one cannot be said to have any more

existence than the other.

THEAETETUS: True.

STRANGER: The same may be said of other things; seeing that the nature

of the other has a real existence, the parts of this nature must equally

be supposed to exist.

THEAETETUS: Of course.

STRANGER: Then, as would appear, the opposition of a part of the other,

and of a part of being, to one another, is, if I may venture to say so,

as truly essence as being itself, and implies not the opposite of being,

but only what is other than being.

THEAETETUS: Beyond question.

STRANGER: What then shall we call it?

111

Sophist