always be sure of being able to reach Mézières, and at the worst the

Belgian frontier. Was it, however, needful to provide for such extreme

eventualities? In certain cases foresight is almost an offence. They

were all of one mind, therefore, to be at their ease.

If they had been uneasy they would have cut the bridges of the Meuse;

but they did not even think of it. To what purpose? The enemy was a long

way off. The Emperor, who evidently was well informed, affirmed it.

The army bivouacked somewhat in confusion, as we have said, and slept

peaceably throughout this night of August 31, having, whatever might

happen, or believing that they had, the retreat upon Mézières open

behind it. They disdained to take the most ordinary precautions, they

made no cavalry reconnaissances, they did not even place outposts. A

German military writer has stated this.[37] Fourteen leagues at least

separated them from the German army, three days' march; they did not

exactly know where it was; they believed it scattered, possessing little

unity, badly informed, led somewhat at random upon several points at

once, incapable of a movement converging upon one single point, like

Sedan; they believed that the Crown Prince of Saxony was marching on

Chalons, and that the Crown Prince of Prussia was marching on Metz; they

were ignorant of everything appertaining to this army, its leaders, its

plan, its armament, its effective force. Was it still following the

strategy of Gustavus Adolphus? Was it still following the tactics of

Frederick II.? No one knew. They felt sure of being at Berlin in a few

weeks. What nonsense! The Prussian army! They talked of this war as of a

dream, and of this army as of a phantom.

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The History of a Crime