give pleasure, if at all, as a secondary matter; and reason tells us,

that we should be contented to make the ease or rapidity of an enquiry,

not our first, but our second object; the first and highest of all being

to assert the great method of division according to species--whether the

discourse be shorter or longer is not to the point. No offence should

be taken at length, but the longer and shorter are to be employed

indifferently, according as either of them is better calculated to

sharpen the wits of the auditors. Reason would also say to him who

censures the length of discourses on such occasions and cannot away with

their circumlocution, that he should not be in such a hurry to have

done with them, when he can only complain that they are tedious, but he

should prove that if they had been shorter they would have made

those who took part in them better dialecticians, and more capable of

expressing the truth of things; about any other praise and blame, he

need not trouble himself--he should pretend not to hear them. But we

have had enough of this, as you will probably agree with me in thinking.

Let us return to our Statesman, and apply to his case the aforesaid

example of weaving.

YOUNG SOCRATES: Very good;--let us do as you say.

STRANGER: The art of the king has been separated from the similar arts

of shepherds, and, indeed, from all those which have to do with herds

at all. There still remain, however, of the causal and co-operative arts

those which are immediately concerned with States, and which must first

be distinguished from one another.