some sense partake of measure. But these persons, because they are

not accustomed to distinguish classes according to real forms, jumble

together two widely different things, relation to one another, and to a

standard, under the idea that they are the same, and also fall into

the converse error of dividing other things not according to their real

parts. Whereas the right way is, if a man has first seen the unity of

things, to go on with the enquiry and not desist until he has found all

the differences contained in it which form distinct classes; nor again

should he be able to rest contented with the manifold diversities which

are seen in a multitude of things until he has comprehended all of them

that have any affinity within the bounds of one similarity and embraced

them within the reality of a single kind. But we have said enough on

this head, and also of excess and defect; we have only to bear in mind

that two divisions of the art of measurement have been discovered which

are concerned with them, and not forget what they are.

YOUNG SOCRATES: We will not forget.

STRANGER: And now that this discussion is completed, let us go on to

consider another question, which concerns not this argument only but the

conduct of such arguments in general.

YOUNG SOCRATES: What is this new question?

STRANGER: Take the case of a child who is engaged in learning his

letters: when he is asked what letters make up a word, should we say

Statesman