YOUNG SOCRATES: Certainly.

STRANGER: Are not examples formed in this manner? We take a thing and

compare it with another distinct instance of the same thing, of which we

have a right conception, and out of the comparison there arises one true

notion, which includes both of them.

YOUNG SOCRATES: Exactly.

STRANGER: Can we wonder, then, that the soul has the same uncertainty

about the alphabet of things, and sometimes and in some cases is firmly

fixed by the truth in each particular, and then, again, in other cases

is altogether at sea; having somehow or other a correct notion of

combinations; but when the elements are transferred into the long and

difficult language (syllables) of facts, is again ignorant of them?

YOUNG SOCRATES: There is nothing wonderful in that.

STRANGER: Could any one, my friend, who began with false opinion ever

expect to arrive even at a small portion of truth and to attain wisdom?

YOUNG SOCRATES: Hardly.

STRANGER: Then you and I will not be far wrong in trying to see the

nature of example in general in a small and particular instance;

afterwards from lesser things we intend to pass to the royal class,

Statesman