STRANGER: And, O heavens, can we ever be made to believe that motion

and life and soul and mind are not present with perfect being? Can

we imagine that being is devoid of life and mind, and exists in awful

unmeaningness an everlasting fixture?

THEAETETUS: That would be a dreadful thing to admit, Stranger.

STRANGER: But shall we say that has mind and not life?

THEAETETUS: How is that possible?

STRANGER: Or shall we say that both inhere in perfect being, but that it

has no soul which contains them?

THEAETETUS: And in what other way can it contain them?

STRANGER: Or that being has mind and life and soul, but although endowed

with soul remains absolutely unmoved?

THEAETETUS: All three suppositions appear to me to be irrational.

STRANGER: Under being, then, we must include motion, and that which is

moved.

THEAETETUS: Certainly.

Sophist