STRANGER: And here, again, is falsehood?

THEAETETUS: Falsehood--yes.

STRANGER: And in like manner, a false proposition will be deemed to

be one which asserts the non-existence of things which are, and the

existence of things which are not.

THEAETETUS: There is no other way in which a false proposition can

arise.

STRANGER: There is not; but the Sophist will deny these statements.

And indeed how can any rational man assent to them, when the very

expressions which we have just used were before acknowledged by us to

be unutterable, unspeakable, indescribable, unthinkable? Do you see his

point, Theaetetus?

THEAETETUS: Of course he will say that we are contradicting ourselves

when we hazard the assertion, that falsehood exists in opinion and in

words; for in maintaining this, we are compelled over and over again

to assert being of not-being, which we admitted just now to be an utter

impossibility.

STRANGER: How well you remember! And now it is high time to hold a

consultation as to what we ought to do about the Sophist; for if we