really is and also is not?

THEAETETUS: Nothing can be plainer.

STRANGER: Then not-being necessarily exists in the case of motion and of

every class; for the nature of the other entering into them all, makes

each of them other than being, and so non-existent; and therefore of all

of them, in like manner, we may truly say that they are not; and again,

inasmuch as they partake of being, that they are and are existent.

THEAETETUS: So we may assume.

STRANGER: Every class, then, has plurality of being and infinity of

not-being.

THEAETETUS: So we must infer.

STRANGER: And being itself may be said to be other than the other kinds.

THEAETETUS: Certainly.

STRANGER: Then we may infer that being is not, in respect of as many

other things as there are; for not-being these it is itself one, and is

not the other things, which are infinite in number.

THEAETETUS: That is not far from the truth.

107

Sophist